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DAMAGE LIABILITY OF CHARITABLE
CORPORATIONS
ROBERT W. HANSEN
C HARITABLE institutions have grown from medieval monasteries
where the "humble men in black" ministered unto the sick and
weary to the skyscraper hospitals and heavily-endowed educational
institutions of this century. With this development has come a corre-
sponding increase in importance of the judicial determinations affecting
the tort liability of such eleemosynary institutions.' Whether or not, or
to what extent a charitable corporation is liable in tort for its negli-
gence, or that of its servants or agents, is a question which has fre-
quently been before the courts. The pendulum has swung from deci-
sions granting such organizations a sweeping, unqualified immunity
from damage liability to decisions refusing to grant even qualified
exemptions from tort liability, holding that such institutions have no
immunity from the commission of wrong not enjoyed by other corpo-
rations engaged in public service. This refusal to impose responsibility
has been placed upon various grounds and the decisions purporting to
explain the reasons are in hopeless conflict. 2 Authorities are not want-
ing for almost every conceivable situation which might arise; when a
state is not bound by one of its own precedents resort may be had to
other jurisdictions for any one of several theories which best suits its
fancy." It is to the task of collating and analyzing such varied and con-
flicting theories that this summary is dedicated.
Presently prevailing theories concerning the immunity from dam-
age liability of charities can be traced to the reign of Her Majesty,
Queen Victoria, when there was presented to the most august tribunal
of the British Isles the question of whether or not a fatherless lad
could hold the'trustees of an orphan asylum liable in their corporate
capacity as feofees of the charity fund for damages alleged to have
been suffered by his wrongful exclusion from such institution.4 Relying
upon an earlier decision,5 the House of Lords denied recovery, holding
that to give damages out of such trust fund would not be to apply it
to those objects which the author of the fund had in mind, but would
be to divert it to a completely different purpose, Lord Campbell re-
marking, "It seems to have been thought that if charity trustees are
guilty of a breach of trust the persons damnified thereby have a right
1 For a well considered analysis of the legal status of charitable corporations
see ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN LAW OF CHARITIES (1924).2Enzery v. Jewish Hospital Ass'n., 193 Ky. 400, 236 S.W. 577 (1921).
3 C. H. Taylor, Charities-Liability for Torts (1927) 2 U. of Cinn. L. Rev. 72.
4 Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12 Cl. & Fin. 507, 8 Eng. Reprint 1508 (1848).
5 Duncan v. Findlater, 6 Cl. & Fin. 894, 7 Eng. Reprint 934 (1839).
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to be indemnified out of trust funds. That is contrary to all reason and
justice and common sense. * * * Damages are to be paid from the
pocket of the wrongdoer not from a trust fund." Although this deci-
sion did not purport to determine the liability of a charitable institu-
tion for actual injury inflicted upon others in the normal transaction of
its business, from its holding and reasoning there has developed much
of the law pertaining to the tort liability of charitable corporations.
Upon the rather insecure foundation of this somewhat inapplicable
and since completely overruled6 English decision, several jurisdictions
in this country have developed the theory of charitable corporation
non-liability known as the "trust fund" theory, based upon the view-
point that funds given for creation of charitable uses should not be
diverted from the purposes for which the fund was established.7 It is
said that to hold a charitable organization liable in tort for its negli-
gence, or that of its servants or agents, would result in a serious deple-
tion of the corpus of the trust fund," would permit trustees of such
fund to do indirectly what the law will not permit them to do directly,
would thwart the purpose of the charity,9 would cripple organizations
which are performing a duty which the public owes to unfortunate
humanity at large,'0 and might discourage donors of such funds from
6 Hillyer v. St. Bartholomew Hosp., [1909] 2 K.B. 820; Foreman v. Canterbury,
L.R. 6 Q.B. 214 (1871) ; Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, L.R. 1 H.L. 93, 35 L.J. Exch.
N.S. 225, 14 Week. Rep. 872 (1866); Trust fund theory no longer has a
footing in the English law, Lavere v. Smith's Falls Public Hospital, 35 Ont.
L.Rep. 98, 9 B.R.C. 13, 26 D.L.R. 346 (1915).
7 Harrington J. Noon, The Liability of Charitable Corporations Arising from
Tort (1930) 5 Notre Dame Lawy. 389; Emery v. Jewish Hospital Ass'n., 193
500, 130 N.E. 55 (1921) ; Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 235 Mass.
66, 126 N.E. 392 (1920); Roberts v. Kirksville College, (Mo. App.) 16 S.W.
(2d) 625 (1929); Adains v. University Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S.W.
453 (1907) ; Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254, 75 Atl. 1087 (1910).
8" * * * it would be against every principle of right and an outrage on justice
to deplete a fund set aside for perpetual charity by using it in paying dam-
ages caused by the acts of those engaged in administering the trust. * * * If
an organization for charitable purposes founded upon the bounty of others
who supply funds for the purpose of administering relief to those in need of
relief and of extending care, aid, and protection to those who have no one to
call upon by the ties of nature, may have its funds diverted from such kindly
purpose, would it not inevitably operate to close the purses of the generous
and benevolent who now do much to relieve the suffering of mankind?"
Adamns v. University Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S.W. 453 (1907); see
also St. Mary's Academy v. Solo-mon, 77 Col. 463, 238 Pac. 22 (1925).
9 "Charitable bequests cannot be thus thwarted by negligence for which the
donor is in no manner responsible. * * * The law jealously guards the char-
itable trust fund and does not permit it to be frittered away by the negligent
acts of those employed in its execution." Downes v. Harper Hospital, 101 Mich.
555, 60 N.W. 42 (1894).
10 "An institution of this character doing charitable work of great benefit to the
public without profit and depending upon gifts, donations, legacies and be-
quests made by charitable persons for the successful accomplishment of its
beneficent purpose is not to be hampered in the acquisition of property and
funds from those wishing to contribute and assist in the charitable work, by
any doubt that might arise in the minds of such intending donors as to whether
the funds supplied by them will be applied to the purposes for which they
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continuing to grant the bequests and donations by which such institu-
tions are kept alive.1
By what authority a charitably inclined individual can attach to a
charitable trust a condition that funds are not to be used to compensate
for injuries done in the necessary fulfillment of its purposes is not
clear. Such individual could not escape liability for his own acts or
those of his agents: how can he by the simple mechanism of incorpora-
tion or creation of a fund render such resources immune from liability?
For, although it is argued that this "should be interpreted not as a
desire to protect the private desires of the creator of the trust so much
as a necessity to preserve the interest of the public in the fund, since
the private desire is important only in that it is a dedication to public
purposes," and that "when the private desire and public desire
coincide and when the dedication to public purposes is made
the private desire to accomplish a public purpose will not be
defeated,"'12 nonetheless, it would seem that this theory permits the will
of an individual to exempt property from the operation of general laws,
thus allowing the will of the subject to nullify the will of the people.13
Therefore, although some courts have argued that every charitable
bequest contains an implied provision that the funds may be used to
defray liability occurring as a result of the administration of the trust, 4
or that donations to a trust do not carry an implied condition that per-
sons maimed in the administration of the trust shall not be compen-
intended to devote them or diverted to the entirely different purpose of satis-fying judgments recovered against the donee because of the negligent acts of
those employed to carry the beneficent purposes into execution." Parks v.
Northwestern University, 218 Ill. 381, 75 N.E. 991 (1905).
21 "The reason given for this rule is that the charity is without any pecuniary
compensation performing a duty which the public owes to unfortunate human-
ity at large and that it is a trust committed to the custodian of such funds by
the charitably disposed in aid of the poor and needy sick and that it would
be contrary to public policy to discourage the persons who contribute such
funds and to divert them to purposes which the donor did not have in con-
templation." Emnery v. Jewish Hospital Ass'n., 193 Ky. 400, 236 S.W. 577 (1921) ;
but see J. Thomas' dissent in same decision, "* * * if the trust fund theory
is sound, as enhancing and protecting a sound public policy it is difficult to
perceive why a municipality could through its negligence be made to appropri-
ate any part of its trust fund, created entirely by donations of its citizens, in
the form of taxes, and this, too, though the corporation be indebted to the
limit allowed by the Constitution."
120. L. McCaskill, Respondeat Superior as Applied in New York to Quasi-
public and Eleemosynary Corporations (1920) 6 Corn L. Q. 56.
13 Bruce v. Central M. E. Church, 147 Mich. 230, 110 N.W. 951 (1907).
14 "All persons who undertake to do charity whether directly or by means of
corporations, agents, or trustees must necessarily know that all human agencies
are liable to err and in the administration of such a trust expect mismanage-
ment and acts of negligence upon the part of those to whom the work is en-
trusted. Therefore, necessarily, there attaches to such a trust a condition that
the funds shall be used to defray any and all liability that may occur as a
result of the administration of the trust." Love v. Nashville Agricultural &
Normal Institute, 146 Tenn. 550, 243 S.W. 304 (1922).
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sated,15 it would seem that the preferable rule would definitely state
that no one, no matter how elevated his motive, or how humane his
purpose, should be permitted to set up the machinery of his charitable
organization with immunity to injury caused by the negligence of those
administering such trust.'6
And, although it has been contended that to deplete a fund set aside
for perpetual charity would be against every principle of right and an
outrage on justice,'7 it is submitted that, if the purpose of the trust is
toward good and not evil, to alleviate suffering and not to increase it,
courts declaring unqualified and unrestricted immunity are perverting
and thwarting the underlying purpose of all charitable bequests when
they compel families of an injured person to contribute their support
and his life to so-called charity.' 8 Be that as it may, in jurisdictions
endorsing the "trust fund" theory, a charitable corporation enjoys a
complete, unrestricted, and unqualified exemption from damage liabil-
ity because "an immunity so grounded admits of no exception."' 9
15 "In conducting the affairs of a hospital its officers and agents are as liable to
commit acts of negligence as are the officers and agents of a railroad or other
business corporation. Experience shows that negligence-the failure to exer-
cise ordinary care-is to be expected when men engage in industrial pursuits.
The donors of the property for hospital purposes were not ignorant of this
fact and are presumed to have given the trust property knowing that it might
be required for the liquidation of claims in tort, as well as for claims in con-
tract, incurred in carrying out the purposes of the trust." Hewett v. Wonans
Hospital Aid Ass'n., 73 N.H. 556, 64 Atl. 190 (1906).
16 Daniels v. Rahway Hospital, (N.J.L. 1932) 160 Atl. 644.
17 "Charity funds are things apart from ordinary matters of business or trade.
In the thoughts and consciences of men, charities are not loaded with the
burdens put upon other matters. Charity suggests different considerations and
treatment from matters of ordinary business, and hence there has arisen out
of the conscience a principle which protects it in its beneficent and perpetual
purpose. The greatest authority has said that, though prophecies shall come
to naught and tongues shall cease, and knowledge shall vanish away, yet 'char-
ity never faileth.' To repeat a thought already suggested, every one, in the
present or in the future, coming within the object of a charity, has a right to
the enjoyment of its benefits, and no one has a right to appropriate to him-
self in the settlement of claims, the fund whereby such benefits are secured.
To permit it to be done would be not only setting aside the purpose of the
donor, but would, in its results, allow the claim of one person to exclude the
rights of all others who may come after him. It would be a matter of grave
concern and regret if funds set apart for support of our charitable institutions
should be made subject to the assaults of the damage claimant." Adams v.
University Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S.W. 453 (1907).
s" * * * the plaintiff appealed for an education to charity and it plucked out
her eye; she asked for bread and it gave her a stone. This is not the Charity
of the Book of Books describing charity for 'charity suffereth long and is
kind.' The reasons that existed in the early days of this country for encour-
aging the efforts of philanthropy in building and equipping hospitals and insti-
tutions of education should no longer be so controlling, for such efforts have
resulted in the erection and maintenance of such institutions enjoying en-
dowments and revenues beyond the imagination of the early lawmakers."
J. Hasbrouck, dissenting in Hamburger v. Cornell University, 204 App. Div.
664, 199 N.Y. Supp. 369 (1923) ; to the same effect see Mclnerny v. St. Luke's
Hospital Assn., 122 Minn. 10, 141 N.W. 837 (1913).
193. Cardozo in Hamburger v. Cornell University, 240 N.Y. 328, 148 N.E. 539
(1925) : "The trust fund doctrine would establish absolute immunity if carried
No. 2]
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Resisting the extremes to which the logic of the "trust fund" theory
impelled them, many courts and text writers bitterly criticized the doc-
trine,2 0 some expressly repudiated all attempts to grant immunity to
charitable corporations, 21 and others, while giving lip service to the
viewpoint, obviously squirmed under its implications.2 2 It remained for
Judge Lowell, in the now historic case of Powers v. Mass. Home-
opathic Hospital,22a to present a new fiction or rationalization to justify
legalistically the exemption of charitable corporations from damage
liability. In that case he held,
"That a man is sometimes deemed to assume a risk of neligence,
so that he cannot sue for damages caused by the negligence is familiar
law. * * * One who accepts the benefit either of a public or of a private
charity enters into a relation which exempts his benefactor from liabil-
ity for the negligence of his servants in administering the charity; at
any rate, if the benefactor has used due care in selecting those servants.
To paraphrase the illustration put by the learned judge before whom
this case was tried, it would be intolerable that a good Samaritan who
takes to his home a wounded stranger for care should be held liable
personally for the negligence of his servant in caring for that stranger.
* * * Were the heart and means of that Samaritan so large that he was
able not only to provide for one wounded man but to establish a hospi-
tal for the care of a thousand it would be no less intolerable that he
should be held liable personally for the negligence of his servants in
caring for any one of those thousand men. We cannot perceive that the
position of the defendant differs from the case supposed. The persons
whose money has established this hospital are good Samaritans perhaps
giving less of personal devotion than did he but by combining their lib-
erality thus enabled to deal with suffering on a larger scale."
This analogy has been subjected to some criticism; at least one
commentator sserts that since trustees act only in their representative
capacity and inasmuch as their charitable inclinations and purity of
purpose are not subject to change, the good Samaritan illustration
to its logical conclusion for all torts committed by such association." Hospital
of St. Vincent v. Thompson, 116 Va. 101, 81 S.E. 13 (1914).
20 For a well reasoned and well analyzed criticism see Bruce v. Young Men's
Christian Assn., 51 Nev. 372, 277 Pac. 798, 801 (1929).
21 Tucker v. Mobile Infirmatory Assn., 191 Ala. 578, 68 So. 4 (1915) ; Glavin v.
R. I. Hospital, 12 R.I. 411, 34 Am. Rep. 675 (1878) (overruled by statute of
Rhode Island legislature) ; Cohen v. Genl. Hospital Soc. 113 Conn. 188, 154 Atl.
435 (1931); Geiger v. Simpson M. E. Church, 174 Minn. 389, 219 N.W. 463
(1928) ; Mclnerny v. St. Luke's Hospital, 122 Minn. 10, 141 N.W. 837 (1913).
This line of authority criticized as a "Shylock view of the matter" that
"reduces the relation of the parties to a cold proposition of business and to
the level of demanding of each other an eye for an eye and a tooth for a
tooth." Cook v. John N. Norton Memorial Infirmary, 180 Ky. 331, 202 S.W.
874, L.R.A. 1918E 647.22 Love v. Nashville Agricultural & Normal Institute, 146 Tenn. 550, 243 S.W.
304 (1922).
22a109 Fed. 294 (C.C.A. 1st, 1901), cert. denied 183 U.S. 695, 22 Sup. Ct. 932,
46 L. Ed. 394 (1901).
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places too strict a rule upon hospital trustees ;23 others argue that
inasmuch as the Biblical individual did not hold himself out to be
competent and qualified to treat or attempt to treat the sick and since
he was not in the business of providing hospital facilities and medical
services the standard the analogy suggests is far too lenient.2 4 Prob-
ably, however, the analogy is in the main a fairly accurate one; the
difficulty with the theory of an implied agreement to waive damage
claims which the illustration presumably indicates is that it is, as ap-
plied to present conditions, essentially fictitious and the danger is, as
in all legal fictions, that it permits the doctrine to enter new fields from
which it would have been excluded had their true character been
known.
Where this criterion is applied, or this rule utilized, it exempts
charitable corporations from damage liability only if they have exer-
cised due care in selecting their employees and servants. 25 Upon prin-
ciple, it would appear to make charitable organizations liable for in-
juries suffered by strangers through the negligence of hospital em-
ployees, for it is difficult to see how any agreement to waive damage
claims could be implied as against a total stranger.26 Moreover, certain
cases come to mind in which it seems almost impossible to spell out a
waiver of a right of action; for example persons temporarily deranged
or temporarily unconscious are conveyed to hospitals for emergency
230 . L. McCaskill, Respondeat Superior as Applied In New York to Quasi-
public and Eleemosynary Corporations (1920) 6 Corn. L. J. 56.
24 " * * * and in the case of the individual instance of the action of the good
Samaritan. * * * it would not constitute an undertaking on his part to render
the service of care of the wounded persons but merely to furnish to the latter
the use of the house as it stood and such ministering care as the facilities
and servants in that home-chosen not for that but for other purposes and
not held out to be suitable or competent for that purpose-might perchance
render in the emergency in which the stranger is found until such time as he
or those owing him the duty to act in the premises may obtain from some
other source some actual undertaking of the rendering of the service of care.
Whereas, in the case of a hospital, the material distinction is that it conducts
a business of rendering the service of the care in question; it holds itself out
as undertaking to perform such services; it tenders such services as an actual
undertaking on its part; and when such tender is accepted by anyone the duty
of performing the undertaking attaches." J. Sims, dissenting in Weston v.
Hospital of St. Vincent, 131 Va. 587, 107 S.E. 785 (1921).25 Baker v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford, Jr., Univ., 133 Cal. App. 243,
23 P. (2d) 1071 (1933) ; Stonaker v. Big Sisters Hospital, 116 Cal. App. 375,
2 P. (2d) 520 (1931).
26 "The law may imply an intention on the part of the donors of the charitable
funds that such funds shall be used for the charitable purpose only and then
imply acquiescence in this intent by all persons who accept the benefit of the
charity and in that way spell out a waiver by such persons of any responsibil-
ity by the institution for the negligence or torts of its ervants. If the courts
want to exempt such institutions this may be a tenable though some may think
a rather ingenious or far-fetched ground on which to do it. But no such
acquiescence or waiver can be attributed to an outsider to a person run over
on the highway by the ambulance of such an institution, by the negligence of
the driver." Kellogg v. Church Charity Foundation, 203 N.Y. 191, 96 N.E. 406
(1911).
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operations, children too young to understand the meaning of contracts
are treated in medical centers, individuals so debilitated by disease that
they have no power of. understanding are often hospitalized. How can
such persons be held to have agreed to an exemption? This doctrine
has been severely critized upon principle,27 especially as applied to pay
patients in charitable hospitals ;28 probably it will never be more than
a minority rule followed only in a numerically unimposing number of
jurisdictions.
These two theories have not exhausted the ingenuity which Amer-
ican jurists brought to the task of rationalizing the position in which
their solicitude for the welfare of eleemosynary institutions placed
them. In some jurisdictions the courts preferred to rest their decisions
upon the principle that "since these charitable hospitals perform a
quasi-public function in ministering to the poor and sick without any
pecuniary profit to themselves, the doctrine of respondeat superior
should not be applied to them in favor of those receiving their char-
itable services. ' 29 It has been said that a fundamental requisite, upon
which the rule of respondeat superior operates is missing, namely, that
there is an absence of any private or pecuniary gain on the part of the
charitable institution by the acts of its servants.30
As a matter of fact, some jurisdictions go farther, holding that
natural persons administering the charity, particularly in the case of
those attending a patient in a charity hospital, are not servants within
the meaning of the word "servants" in that the corporation receives
neither pecuniary benefit nor profit from their services, and that there-
fore, the rule of respondeat superior does not apply.31 This rule has
met with disapproval in some quarters. Adherence to the exemption
from the respondeat superior rule"2 probably grants a charity exemption
27 Gamnble v. Vanderbilt University, 138 Tenn. 616, 200 S.W. 510 (1917). "How
an agreement to waive away a claim for damages for one life, one's arm,
one's leg or one's eye can be implied where there is utter ignorance on the
part of the recipient of charity that such an unconscionable deprivation of
human right follows the acceptance of charity, I cannot fathom," J. Hasbrouck
dissenting in Hamburger v. Cornell University, 204 App. Div. 664, 199 N.Y.
Supp. 369 (1923).
28 "She has depended upon no charity; she has sought none but was to pay a
reasonable price for what she received. * * * We are unable to conceive upon
what principle the theory of 'implied assent' could be applied to one who pays
full price and without regard to the nature of the institution from which she
receives her service. * * * It is a principle of law as well as morals that men
must be just before they are generous." Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Assn.,
191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915).29 Morrison v. Henke, 165 Wis. 166, 160 N.W. 173 (1917).
30 Harrington J. Noon, The Liability of Charitable Corporations Arising from
Tort, (1930) 5 Notre Dame Lawy. 389.
3110 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1931) c. 54 § 4930; See
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92(1914).
32 "That doctrine itself (respondeat superior) had its origin in considerations of
public policy. It doubtless will be in the future as it always has been devel-
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from liability for injuries caused by the negligence of its servants,
whether the person injured was a beneficiary, servant, or stranger,"
at least in the absence of statutes of general application.M However,
it would seem that this rule would not exempt such institutions from
the non-delegable duty 35 of exercising due care in the selection of its
servants, agents, and employes.3 6 While it may be true that the rule of
respondeat superior is "a hard rule at best'37 and despite learned argu-
ments advanced to establish that the rule of respondeat superior was
never intended to apply to any persons except those who received some
profit or other emolument from the activities of their servants, 38 it is
submitted that this rule, unless it be interpreted as a statement of public
policy and nothing more, mistakes the foundation of the master's liabil-
ity which is based on the maxim "qui facit per alium, facit per se," 39
that it assumes men to be exempt from the consequences of negligence
oped, modified, or extended as the necessities of new social and economic
conditions demand and the exemption of liability of such organizations, sub-ject to the condition of care in the selection or retention of servants, which
condition is so frequently found in the decisions of the courts on the subject
indicates the general judgment that the exemption from the operation of the
rule of respondeat superior which experience has shown to be a valuable aid
in securing the ends of justice should not be sweeping and complete but should
be surrounded by such safeguards as will prevent the neglect of a duty which
the hospital can and should perform." Taylor v. Flower Deaconness Hoine
& Hospital, 104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N.E. 287 (1922).
33 "The fundamental reason why a charitable organization should not be held
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior is not based upon any situa-
tion that the injured person may occupy towards the charitable corporation,
but upon the inherent and well recognized distinction between such charitable
corporations, organized as they are with the primary and principal purpose of
assisting the sick, unfortunate, or needy, or other instances of deserving
humanity, and without provision for or expectancy of receiving financial re-
turns for such particular service, compared with corporations which are pri-
marily and principally organized for or in expectation of private gain." Bach-
nan v. Young Women's Christian Assn., 179 Wis. 178, 191 N.W. 751 (1922).
34 Wilson V. Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Reformation, 202 Wis. 111, 230
N.W. 708 (1930).
35 "There are undoubtedly acts performed by agents of a corporation which may
be attributed to the corporation itself and which do not depend upon the rule
of respondeat superior. It is true that all corporations, being in a sense ficti-
tious, must act through means of personal agents, but we have long since
gotten away from the opinion, which obtained early in the history of corpora-
tions, that they are without soul, mind, hands, or body and therefore not
chargeable with either wrongful acts of commission or of omission. The souls
and minds of natural persons shape their course, direct their operations, and
control their activities, and whatever is done by those vho shape a corpora-
tion's course is the conduct of the corporation itself; and where the corpora-
tion itself conducts the affairs in such a way as to do injury to others, it
ought to be held accountable and no rule of immunity ought to be extended
to it unless demanded by reason of public policy." Love v. Nashville Agricul-
tural & Normal Inst., 146 Tenn. 550, 243 S.W. 304 (1922).
36 C. H. Taylor, Charities-Liability for Torts (1927) 2 U. of Cinn. L. Rev. 72;
City Hospital of Akron v. Lewis, 47 Ohio App. 465, 192 N.E. 150 (1934);
Taylor v. Flower Deaconness Home & Hospital, 104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N.E.
287 (1922).
3 Roberts v. Ohio Valley General Hospital, 98 W.Va. 476, 127 S.E. 318 (1925).
38 Hearns v .Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 Atl. 595 (1895).
31 Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Assi., 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915).
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because they are on missions of mercy, and that its logical extension
would require courts to exempt clergymen and doctors whose motive
and service to humanity are of an identical nature from the conse-
quences of the negligence of their agents, a step to which no court
seems willing to go.
Yet another so-called theory of liability exemption is the "public
policy" theory, the viewpoint that judicial refusal to permit damage
claimants to recover against charities is founded on the ground that
public policy encourages the support of charitable institutions and pro-
tects their resources from the maw of litigation. 40 In one sense, these
"considerations of public policy" as one court has termed them,41 are
the bases of all of the various theories herein analyzed, for "underlying
all of them is the matter of public policy and it is upon this that the
rule may be said finally to rest.142 Courts which have advanced, adopt-
ed, and defended the "trust fund" theory, the "implied waiver" theory,
the "inapplicability of respondeat superior" theory have done so
because they' have felt that it would be contrary to public policy to
permit recovery against a charity, at any rate if due care had been
exercised in selecting and retaining employees and attendants; at least
one cannot escape the definite impression that all of the various the-
ories, ingenious and plausible as they may appear, are but rationaliza-
tions of the standpoint to which the jurists' sympathies and inclinations
impelled them. It is admitted that in organized society the rights of the
individual must in some instances be subordinated to the public good;
in the field of damage liability of charitable corporations many courts
have felt that, at least under certain conditions, it is better for the
individual to suffer injury without compensation than for the public
to be deprived of the benefit of the charity ;43 although other jurists
have felt that charities should compensate those injured by the negli-
gence of their servants before going farther afield to dispense charity.44
40 Duncan v. Nebraska Sanitarium, 92 Neb. 162, 137 N.W. 1120 (1912); Jensen
v. Maine Eye & Ear Infirnary, 107 Me. 408, 78 At. 898 (1910).
41 Wilson v. Evangelical Church of the Reformation, 202 Wis. 111, 230 N.W. 708
(1930).
42 Ettlinger v. Randolph-Mason College, 31 F. (2d) 869 (C.C.A. 4th, 1929).43 As cases founded upon "public policy" theory see Lindler v. Cohmbia Hospital,
98 S.C. 25, 81 S.E. 512 (1914); Magnusson v. Swedish Hospital, 99 Wash.
399, 169 Pac. 829 (1908) ; Weston v. Hosp. of St. Vincent of Paul, 131 Va. 587,
107 S.E. 785 (1921) ; Love v. Nashville Agricultural & Normal Institute, 146
Tenn. 550, 243 S.E. 304 (1922); Hoke v. Glenn, 167 N.C. 594, 83 S.E. 807(1914).
4 Geiger v. Simpson M. E. Church, 174 Minn. 389, 219 N.W. 463, 465 (1928).
"While such institutions should be encouraged and those who are charitably
inclined should likewise be encouraged to support them, this encouragement
must not be carried to the point where injustices will be done to others." Sis-
ters of Charity v. Duvelius, 123 Ohio St. 52, 173 N.E.737 (1930). "We do not
believe that a policy of irresponsibility best subserves the beneficent purpose
for which the hospital is maintained. We do not appreciate the public policy
which would require the widow and children of deceased rather than the cor-
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While the "public policy" theory at least possesses the not unim-
portant virtue of reqiring no legalistic fiction or involved syllogistic
argument to explain its existence, it is hardly a satisfactory foundation
upon which to ground the damage liability of charitable corporations
for the reason that it affords no objective standard or criterion by
which to determine liability. Public policy, in this as in other cases,
is too likely to vary with the individual reactions, sympathies, and
backgrounds of individual judges to constitute a satisfactory ratio
diciendii by which to determine liability, although some claim that such
flexibility is its greatest value." Adoption of or adherence to this theory
would in no manner clarify the muddled state of the law concerning
tort liability of non-profit corporations if such a thing were possible, it
might heighten and increase the confusion.
Is there then no Promised Land of judicial clarity toward which
the wilderness-weary Israelites can be led? Is the field of the law con-
cerning the damage liability of charitable corporations to remain in
utter confusion unto the end? It is the deliberate conviction of the
writer that as long as courts of last resort persist in building legal
fictions and advancing legalistic theories to justify considering char-
ities apart from other community enterprises and persist in following
such fictions and theories to whatever illogical extremes their implica-
tions extend, confusion and contradiction are inevitable. It is the posi-
tion of the writer that tort liability, in this field, as in others, should
be ascertained by determining what duty was owed by the person
against whom damages are claimed and by then determining whether
or not there was a failure to observe such duty, or in other words,
whether there was negligence.
Fifty years ago an authority on the law of torts wrote, "* * * where
negligence in the performance of a legal duty is brought home to any
one, and another has suffered damages therefrom, an action will lie.""
It is submitted that application of this elementary rule to the law of
charities would afford substantially equivalent protection to charities
generally and would do so without involving the spinning of webs of
legal theory. In every case, the law would ask the questions, What
duty was owed by this hospital or university? What did it undertake
to do? What was its obligation to the plaintiff ? Much of the confusion
in this phase of the law arises from a lack of understanding of what a
poration to suffer the loss incurred through the fault of the corporation's
employees, or in other words which would compel the persons damaged to
contribute the amount of their loss to the purpose of even the most worthy
corporation." Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392,
175 N.W. 699, 701 (1920).
45 Taylor v. Flower Deaconness Home & Hospital, 104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N.E.
287 (1922).
46 COOLEY, A TREATIsE ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1878) 659.
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hospital or charity undertakes to do; realistic and accurate statement
of such duty or obligation would indicate what the institution can and
should be expected to do. More than that no fair minded persons
could expect and no law would attempt to require.
Mr. Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, while a member of the court of
last resort of the state of New York, wrote a decision concerning the
liability of an educational institution to a student injured while doing
laboratory work within its classrooms.47 The decision indicates and
embodies an approach to the problem of damage liability of charitable
corporations which is sorely needed in 'the law today; it states the
standard of care to be applied to such institutions as follows:
"With us a hospital or university owes to patients or to students
whatever duty of care and diligence is attached to the relation as rea-
sonably implicit in the nature of the undertaking and the purpose of the
charity. All that is thus included is not susceptible of enumeration in
advance of the event. It cannot be less however than appropriate in-
vestigation of the character and capacities of the agencies of service
from the highest to the lowest. This is a duty that devolves upon the
corporation itself and one not to be shaken off by delegation or sur-
render."
Adoption of this approach requires a realistic analysis of "the
nature of the undertaking" of a present day hospital or charitable insti-
tution. In the case of the hospital, such institution hardly duplicates
the medicine show savant's willingness to guarantee recovery from
serious illness. It does not even undertake the duties of medical men
or to give medical advice but merely that patients shall have competent
medical advice and assistance: if it has employed competent, skillful,
and duly qualified medical men or hospital attendants, it has done all
that it is possible for it to do. Or, in the words of Justice Cardozo,
"Such a hospital undertakes not to heal or attempt to heal through
the agency of others but merely to supply others who will heal or at-
tempt to heal on their own responsibility. * * * A patient resorting to
the hospital gains the benefit of facilities that would otherwise not be
available. If these are furnished he has no other remedy for the errors
of surgeons or physicians, carefully sleected, who have given him
treatment in a ward than he would have if the same men upon the rec-
ommendation of the hospital had given him treatment at home. By
fair implication he must look to them alone. * * * We think a hospital's
immunity from liability for errors of physicians and surgeons is
matched in the case of a university by a like immunity from liability
for the errors of professors or instructors or other members of its
staff of teachers. * * * There is indeed a duty to select them with due
care."
47Ha7?sburger v. Cornell University, 240 N.Y. 328, 148 N.E. 539 (1925).
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It is apparent that this approach to the problem of a charitable cor-
poration's liability for torts committed by its employees does not abol-
ish nor cripple the immunity from damage claims today possessed by
such institutions. As a matter of fact it does not alter such exemption,
for, the overwhelming weight of authority in this country establishes
that, except as to strangers, or servants, a charitable corporation is not
responsible for the negligence of its servants and attendants, unless it
has been guilty of a want of ordinary care in the selection or retention
of such servants. 48 However, while approaching the subject of dam-
4sPowers v. Mass. Honteopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294 (C.C.A. 1st, 1901);
Denting Ladies Hospital Assn. v. Price, 276 Fed. 668 (C.C.A. 8th, 1921) ; Union
P. P. Co. v. Artist, 60 Fed. 365 (C.C.A. 8th, 1894); Henry W. Putnanm Memo-
ral Hospital v. Allen, 34 F. (2d) 927 (C.C.A. 2d, 1929); Higgons v. Pratt
Institute, 45 F. (2d) 698 (C.C.A. 2d, 1930) ; Hillyer v. St. Bartholomew's Hos-
pital, [1909] 2 K.B. 820; Evans v. Liverpool, [1906] 1 K.B. 160; Hall v. Lees,
[1904] 2 K.B. 602; Lewis v. Y. M. C. A., 206 Cal. 115, 273 Pac. 580 (1928);
Baker v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford, Jr., University, 133 Cal. App.
243, 23 P. (2d) 1071 (1933) ; Stonaker v. Big Sisters Hospital, 116 Cal. App.
375, 2 P. (2d) 520 (1931) ; Phoenix Assurance Co. v. Salvation Army, 83 Cal.
App. 455, 256 Pac. 1106 (1927); Hawthorne v. Blythewood, Inc., 118 Conn.
617, 174 Atl. 81 (1934) ; Cashman v. Meriden Hospital, 113 Conn. 188, 154 Atl.
435 (1933) ; Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 Atl. 595 (1895);
Jackson v. Atlanta Goodwill Industries, 46 Ga. App. 425, 167 S.E. 702 (1933) ;
Georgia Baptist Hospital v. Smith, 37 Ga. App. 92, 139 S.E. 101 (1927) ; Butler
v. Berry School, 27 Ga. App. 560, 109 S.E. 544 (1921); Morton v. Savannah
Hospital, 148 Ga. 438, 96 S.E. 887 (1918) ; -Old Folks Home v. Roberts, 91 Ind.
App. 533, 171 N.E. 10 (1930) ; St. Vincent's Hospital v. Stine, 195 Ind. 350,
144 N.E. 537 (1924); Old Folks Hone v. Roberts, 83 Ind. App. 546, 149 N.E.
188 (1925); Mikola v. Sisters of Mercy, 183 Iowa 1378, 168 N.W. 219 (1918);
Ratliffe v .Wesley Hospital, 135 Kan. 306, 10 P. (2d) 859 (1932); Pavin v.
Kansas Medical Missionar.v & Benevolent Assn., 103 Kan. 48, 172 Pac. 1002
(1918); Nicholson v. A. T. & S. F. Hospital Assn., 97 Kan. 480, 155 Pac.
920 (1916) ; Foye v. St. Francis Sanitarium, 2 La. App. 305 (1925) ; Thibo-
daux v. Sisters of Charity, I. W., 11 La. App. 423, 123 So. 466 (1929);
Mclnerny v. St. Luke's Hospital, 122 Minn. 10, 141 N.W. 837 (1913); Geiger
v. Simpson M.E. Church, 174 Minn. 389, 219 N.W. 463 (1928); Miss. Baptist
Hospital v. Moore, 156 Miss. 676, 126 So. 465 (1930) ; Jazmes v. Yazoo & M.
Valley R. Co., 153 Miss. 776, 121 So. 819 (1929) ; Sinwns v. Northern Pac. R.
Co., 94 Mont. 355, 22 P. (2d) 609 (1933) ; Bruce v. Y. M. C. A., 51 Nev. 372,
277 Pac. 798 (1929) ; Hanburger v. Cornell University, 240 N.Y. 328, 148 N.E.
539 (1925) ; Wilson v. N. Y. Homeopathic Medical College, 122 Misc. 452, 204
N.Y. Supp. 175 (1924); Goodman v. Brooklyn Hebrew 0. Asylum, 179 App.
Div. 682, 165 N.Y. Supp. 949 (1917); Cowans v. N. C. Baptist Hospital, 197
N.C. 41, 147 S.E. 672 (1929) ; Barden v. Atl. C. L. Co., 152 N.C. 318, 67 S.E.
971 (1910) ; Hoke v. Glenn, 167 N.C. 594, 83 S.E. 807 (1914) ; City Hospital of
Akron v. Lewis, 47 Ohio App. 465, 192 N.E. 150 (1934); Taylor v. Flower
Deaconness Hospital, 104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N.E. 287 (1922); Rudy v. Lake-
side Hospital, 115 Ohio St. 539, 155 N.E. 126 (1926) ; Sisters of Charity v.
Duvelius, 123 Ohio St. 52, 173 N.E. 737 (1930); Carver Chiropractic College
v. Armstrong, 103 Okla. 123, 299 Pac. 641 (1924); Wallwork v. City of Nash-
ville, 147 Tenn. 681, 251 S.W. 775 (1923); Love v. Nashville Agricultural &
Normal Institute, 146 Tenn. 550, 243 S.W. 304 (1922) ; Steele v. St. Joseph's
Hospital, 60 S.W. (2d) 1083 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) ; St. Paul's Sanitarit v.
Williamson, 164 S.W. 36 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914); Barnes v. Providence Sani-
tarium, 229 S.W. 588 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Gitzhoffen v. Sisters of Holy
Cross Hospital Assn., 32 Utah 46, 88 Pac. 691 (1907); Norfolk Protestant
Hospital v. Plunkett, (Va. 1934) 173 S.E. 363; Weston v. Hospital of St. Vin-
cent, 131 Va. 587, 107 S.E. 785 (1921) ; Thurston City Chapter ANRC v. Dept.
of Labor & Industries, 166 Wash. 488, 7 P. (2d) 577 (1932) ; Tribble v. Miss.
• ' N6.2] '
104 THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19
age liability of charities from the standpoint of the duty or undertaking
of non-profit hospitals and similar institutions may not alter the prevail-
ing rulings, it definitely obviates the necessity of developing and de-
fending intricate theories.
It is suggested that such theories assumed that hospitals and simi-
lar institutions were insurers of the efficacy of the treatment provided
and guarantors of the ability and competence of attendants and em-
ployees, and attempted to exempt such institutions from liability there-
for. If so, they have succeeded only in granting immunity from a
non-existent liability. For, while a hospital undertakes to use care in
the selection and retention of its doctors and nurses and holds itself
out to the public as offering its comforts and facilities as they are,49
its obligation does not extend further than the furnishing of trained
and experienced medical and surgical practitioners." Such obligation
has been carefully set forth in an English case as follows: "The duty
which the law implies in the relation of the patient and the correspond-
ing liability are limited. The governors of a public hospital by their
admission of the patient to enjoy in the hospital the gratuitous benefit
of its care do, I think, undertake that the patient whilst there shall be
treated only by experts, whether surgeons, physicians, or nurses, of
whose professional competence they have taken reasonable care to
assure themselves; and further that those experts shall have at their
disposal for the care and treatment of the patient fit and proper appara-
tus and appliances. But I see no ground for holding it to be a right
legal inference from the circumstances of hospital and patient that the
hospital authority makes itself liable in damages if members of its
professional staff of whose competence there is no question act negli-
gently toward the patient in some matter of professional care or
skill." 5
1
The corporation or individual that administers such charitable trusts
must after all leave the treatment of the patients to the superior knowl-
edge and skill of the physician.52 They cannot direct the latter, as the
master may ordinarily direct the servant what to do and how to do it.
They do not undertake to act through such agents but merely to pro-
cure them to act upon their own responsibility. The only responsibility
devolving upon such organizations is to exercise reasonable care in
Sisters of S. H., 137 Wash. 326, 242 Pac. 372 (1926) ; Susmann v. Y. M. C. A.,
101 Wash. 487, 172 Pac. 554 (1918) ; Roberts v. Ohio Valley General Hospital,
98 W.Va. 476, 127 S.E. 318 (1925) ; Morrison v. Henke, 165 Wis. 166, 160 N.W.
173 (1917).
49 Old Folks & 0. Children's Home v. Roberts, 91 Ind. App. 533, 171 N.E. 10
(1930).
50 Foote v. Shaw Stewart, 49 Scot. L.R. 39 (1912).
51 Hillyer v. St. Bartholomew's Hospital, [1909] 2 K.B. 820.
52 Union P. R. Co. v. Artist, 60 Fed. 365 (C.C.A. 8th, 1894).
53 Schloendorf v. Society of N. Y. Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
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selecting and retaining those whom they trust to care for those placed
in their custody,54 for employees and servants selected with ordinary
care will execute the charity with but few mistakes.5 5 No one can deter-
mine the duty owed by charitable institutions under every possible set
of facts; however, it is submitted that only by ascertaining what such
obligation actually is can a proper and sensible approach to the subject
of damage liability of charitable corporations be attained.
Many years have passed since the English jurists saw fit to protect
the resources of Heriot's Hospital from the onslaught of damage claim-
ants. Charitable institutions have developed into the heavily endowed
medical centers and mighty educational institutions of our era. Facili-
ties for public liability insurance have been extended. Trained hospital
atendants, medical experts, and experienced instructors are no longer
uncommon. With such changes the doctrine of unqualified exemption
from damage liability, permitting hospital administrators to send
butchers armed with cleavers to perform delicate operations with im-
punity to consequences, has largely passed into the discard. In its place
there has developed and, let us hope, there will continue to develop a
qualified, guarded, and restricted exemption from damage liability aris-
ing from and limited by the obligation or actual undertaking of the
charitable institution to the damage claimant.
54 Westont v. Hospital of St. Vincentt, 131 Va. 587, 107 S.E. 785 (1921).
55 Roberts v. Ohio Valley Gei. Hospital, 98 W.Va. 476, 127 S.E. 318 (1925).
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